This article aims to explain how and why foreign oil and gas companies carry influence over the government in the upstream oil and gas sector. It looks at the troubling issue of domination in Indonesia particularly before the Gross Split mechanism was introduced. From a transnational point of view, states and non-states continuously attempt to overpower the other to gain the most from this industry. Although the roles and obligations of foreign oil and gas companies are strictly regulated, domination is still visible in areas of cost recovery to add to the weak domestic market resulting in an asymmetric competition. Market failures have become increasingly alarming as liftings continue to fail to reach the national quota. Using the introduction of the Gross Split mechanism as a turning point, this article looks back at how transnationalism has translated into this sector. This article is of the view that the lack of effort to enrich knowledge bases, enforce the adoption of appropriate technology and prepare its domestic market for healthy competition, has brought it further away from addressing its underlying issues.
Introduction
Once a cornerstone of the oil and gas market, Indonesia pumped 1.5 million barrels of oil a day and in 1997 and was host to the meeting of oil ministers from the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), making it one of the most strategic sectors of the Indonesian economy (Salna & Rusmana, 2017) . Today, it faces the troubling issue of domination being largely operated by foreign companies. The Directorate-General for Oil and Gas reveals that from the period 2001-2011 alone 74% of the upstream oil and gas sectors were managed by companies of foreign headquarters. The Regulatory Agency for Upstream Oil and Gas Activity reports a contribution of 30% to the national income from the mining sector, most of whom are of foreign headquarters (Bulletin BP Migas No. 65, 2010) .
Before the Gross Split Mechanism, the Cost Recovery Mechanism reimbursed costs of exploration, development, and operation out of gross production, which heavily consumed the national budget. Reasons for this being (a) large costs including costs of preceding years. It is worth noting that it can take several years of exploration and investment before production can start (Indonesia Investments, 2016) . Secondly, (b) it has significantly lowered profit cuts of the government. Practices in the past have shown that the government's share can be as low as 40 percent, or less, from the expected 85 percent share. It is estimated that between 2002 and 2016 nearly $4 billion was spent -in vain-by oil and gas companies in the exploration stage in Indonesia without finding reserves suitable for commercial exploitation (Indonesia Investments, 2016) .
The Cost Recovery Mechanism has also (c) caused infighting among Indonesian officials, with central and local governments vying for their share (MKRI, 2012) . Fourth, (d) domestic production quotas have not been met for a long time. Most of Indonesia's oil production originates from maturing oil fields that are These prices are not always based on 'supply and demand' as they are steered by foreign companies (MKRI, 2012) . This has prompted the government to rethink its cooperation scheme without slashing investments but still reaching the national quota and cutting reasonable profits. However, it was not until 2016 when the Gross Split Mechanism was introduced as a replacement of the Cost Recovery Mechanism.
Under the Gross Split Mechanism, government profit cuts have become promising while offering something in return for oil and gas companies. It allows for efficiency of work, measurable progress, and level competition.
Further, it is considerate towards investment barriers like permits and taxation (Bumi, 2017) and looks into ways of simplifying the administration to enhance its appeal. Even so, scholars argue that the Gross Split Mechanism is not fiscally superior to its predecessor in terms of risk-bearing (Bergamann & Giranza, 2017) . This is problematic for the long run, as both mechanisms neither address all five forms of domination explained above, nor establish a long-term solution. The structure of the country's oil-sector institutions, definition of terms governing relationships with companies and mechanisms for transparency and accountability will have a major impact on whether Indonesia is able to reverse the decline in sector performance and increase the benefits that accrue to citizens (Bria, Emmanuel., Heller, Patrick., & Lassourd, Thomas. eds., 2016) .
This article carries urgency, as nonstate actors are gaining increasing relevance in the study of global governance where the superiority of states as main agents of the international world is challenged (Rosenau, 2002) and their ability to by-pass governments, are impactful (Mas'oed, 1990) consciousness, which is a multi locality desire to connect oneself with others (Vertovec, 1999:5) creating a transnational bond held together or re-created through the mind, through cultural artifacts and a shared imagination (Cohen, 1996: 516) . After the World Wars, nations have resorted to cooperation and taking part in mutual efforts to become more connected and, at the same time, gain more from working together than against each other. Secondly, (b) cultural reproduction, which states often take advantage of by using the rapid developments of global media and communications (Vertovec, 1999) to transform their identities through the policies they make and publicize it to the world. Thirdly, it also looks at (c) political engagements in the transnational world. It comes in many forms like distribution of resources (especially from constituent bodies in wealthy countries to ones in poorer countries), facilitating support in political campaigns, and providing safe havens abroad (Vertovec, 1999 (Alger 1997 , Castells 1997 .
Lastly, it examines (d) avenue of capital, which is a stark development to pre World War times when most resources were allocated for military purposes. Today, governments favor the strength of the economy (Sullivan, 1982) .
A strong economy is associated with strong political power. This, however, generated a myriad of transnational cooperation worldwide which are defined as firms with the ability to coordinate and control operations in more than two countries, although they do not fully own them (Dicken, 1998) . The rise of transnational cooperation worldwide, in turn, gave birth to a transnational capitalist class comprising of TNC executives, globalizing state bureaucrats, politicians and professionals, and consumerist elites in merchandising and the media (Sklair, 2005) . Together, they constitute new power elites whose interests are global, rather than exclusively local or national, and who thereby control most of the world economy (Vertovec, 1999 driving forces it will lead to a conclusion of a closer approximation of the truth.
Deductive-Inductive Approach
To inform this article, it will use a deductive-inductive approach which was first initiated by Francis Bacon (Mouly, 1984) . deductive reasoning is used to lead to a conclusion and inductive reasoning is carried out to form a hypothesis. When logic is insufficient to inform analysis, a hypothesis is set out in advance. It helps the scholar to optimize findings and data because without knowing anything in advance, it forms absolute objectivity and a valid conclusion. Only after a hypothesis is settled, deductive reasoning is carried out. The conclusion, therefore, is a confirmation of the hypothesis. Paper, 2015) . However, it has not translated into a finely tuned bureaucracy.
Indonesian Oil and Gas Provisions

Many argue that the Regulatory Agency for
Upstream Oil and Gas Activity is ever more prone to lobbying and political engagements.
The reason for this is because they are positioned, as if, equivalent to the contractors.
As such, the scheme of relations follows that of (Kasali, 2008) .
Today, Aramco is one of the few, alongside Malaysia, to use oil and gas national consolidation mechanisms. Aramco, in particular, achieves cost optimization through negotiating lower costs for rigs, materials, and services. They introduced a program to recondition equipment and materials, resulting in significant savings, and deployed offshore floating hubs to supply tools and materials.
These efforts enabled a reduction in overall good costs compared to 2015 (Saudi Aramco, 2018).
The system gives full control to the state-owned enterprise, guaranteeing leadership in projects executed within the country or its territorial waters. As such, the system maximizes the power and reach of the enterprise. It also eliminates the need for complex negotiations between the state and private oil and gas companies (Bria, Emmanuel., Heller, Patrick., & Lassourd, Thomas. eds., 2016) .
What this informs is that profit shares, adoption of technology, and transfer of knowledge are crucial. For exporters, it serves as a measurement of political prowess and is reflected in their increasing levels of export. It contributing greatly to ineffective costs and, in turn, profit cuts after Cost Recovery.
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The the effectiveness of production, risks can be better managed and, in time, cull greater profits.
As very little has been done to cull this valuable knowledge and technology, there is also little to suggest that the Gross Split mechanism will cultivate better profits, reduce infighting among bureaucracies, achieve the national production quota.
Absence of the State in Asymmetric Competition
It has been established that foreign companies can only be granted exploration and exploitation rights in the upstream sector. They also serve the purpose of enriching the national knowledge base of Indonesian oil and gas. As a whole, it is within the interest of the government to support its domestic pillars to support stronger markets, energy resistance, and add value to its resources, expand job markets, and enable steady and long term supplies of oil 
Market Failure
Three elements reflect vulnerability in the oil and gas sector. According to Notonagoro (2016), these factors make Indonesia the weaker opposition in the global competition.
Firstly, the orientation of oil and gas is not directed at securing its national energy security, it is aimed at fulfilling short-term revenues which can often leave a greater burden for the state through the years to come. The view of the government is that oil and gas function as commodities to meet its high levels of demands and fast rate of consumption, rather than viewing them as useful resources to strategically improve its national development.
In trying to simultaneously attract investment and make sure it derives maximum benefits,
Indonesia needs a clear-eyed and objective
analysis of what kinds of policies are likely to deliver long-term returns to the people of Indonesia (Bria, Emmanuel., Heller, Patrick., & Lassourd, Thomas. eds., 2016) . This needs to be set out earlier than later as this will serve as its guide through settling a long term mechanism that best suits the needs of the upstream oil and gas. If change is ever to take place, it must be accompanied by a blueprint that can see ahead.
Secondly, Indonesia is running out of oil and gas (Notonagoro, 2016) . Indonesian reserves are generally mature which often translate into low amounts of crude oil and uncertainty over future rewards from investment (Academic Paper, 2017) . Note that the discovery of oil has decreased significantly Lastly, Indonesia is vulnerable due to its constant pursuit of short-term revenue without added-value. This is a large homework for the future of Indonesian oil and gas should it wish to continue competing globally (Notonagoro, 2016) . Few discoveries leading to proven reserves were made after the 1980s.
Meanwhile, the country's rising economic welfare is accompanied by rising energy consumption, driven largely by the high growth of private vehicle ownership. For this reason, Indonesia has been a net oil importer since 2005 (Bria, Emmanuel., Heller, Patrick., & Lassourd, Thomas. eds., 2016) . As an importer of oil and gas for its domestic consumption, it is becoming increasingly dependant on other nations to meets its needs. An example, Indonesia is dependant on oil refineries lent by neighboring countries to process its crude oil productions. For this reason, scholars have suggested shifting focus from export to improving national development by using its existing reserves for national consumption only to reduce fiscal dependence on oil and gas and prioritize (Academic Paper, 2017) .
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Economic Driving Force
There is a stark consciousness that mining companies are investments in that is invested in the country, an added value of $1,6 million is achieved and increases the Gross Domestic Product of $0,7 million while opening vacancies of up to 100 (Gewati, 2017) . The rest was covered by gains from the downstream sector. In contrast to this, stateowned companies only contributed $3 billion in total. Foreign companies have triggered a double-chain effect as taxes have risen further, contributing significantly to national income (Hukumonline, 2013) . As analyzed by Notonagoro (2016) , this complexity led to a shift of orientation in oil and gas where it is no longer directed at energy security. It is aimed at fulfilling short-term revenues with no added values for generations to come. By being economically upper-hand, the government is more prone to culturally reproducing this as the norm of working with foreign companies focusing on strategic sectors of the nation like oil and gas. Political engagements are becoming increasingly centered on finding a common ground that benefits both sides, as opposed to meeting the needs of the nation at the expense of heavily invested companies. All in all, mining companies have become an avenue of capital that has presented governments the illusion of expanding their workforce, accelerating their economic growth, and contributing to a success they would have otherwise not been able to achieve. In this sense, the economic driving force exceeds the government in all four aspects.
Environmental Driving Force
More obvious than not, the environment should be preserved if not prioritized. 
Indroyono Soesilo, secretary of the Coordinating
Minister for People's Welfare stated that the country is struggling to achieve a transfer of technology due to expensive copyrights that are beyond affordability (Sagita, 2012) .
Although industrialized nations exceed in green technology, developing countries will not be able to afford them if expensive copyright fares apply. As a country with vast marine and forest areas, Indonesia plays a significant role in absorbing emissions. Despite contributing insignificantly to the world's carbon emissions, countries with large marine and forest areas will suffer the most from climate change (Jakarta Globe, 2012). In contrast, companies that advance in the technology needed to balance this gap lack goodwill to transfer the rights of technology in a way that benefits both sides. The underpinning reason being funds and lack of enforcement. Oil and gas companies reluctant to make these transfers take advantage of CSR programs to bridge this gap. By shifting the focus, they culturally produce the notion of 'giving back'. In places where the local government is displaced, their CSR programs cull greater audiences.
Understanding this, as long as political engagements continue to place international oil and gas companies as drivers, engagement will focus more on publicity and less on achieving tangible transfers of technology and knowledge that the environment needs. Oil and gas companies will continue to serve as an avenue of capital that only serves short-term revenues with no added value to the economy, and even less to the environment. In this contestation, the government has more agendas to push for but is dependant on the regime. Mining companies have a greater advantage in all regions except for consciousness.
Sustainable Development Driving Force
Multinationals have used CSR to face strong competitive pressures. Driven purely by commerce whilst facing a limit to global oil reserves, they make use of all means available to gain a competitive advantage over rivals (Frynas, 2009 Cultural reproductions play an important role in shaping the agenda for governments and mining industries. However, as long as the government still lacks the political will to set its priorities, the asymmetric balance of power will remain present.
Political Engagements
Political engagements are becoming increasingly centered on finding a common ground that benefits both sides, as opposed to meeting the needs of a nation at the expense of heavily invested companies.
As long as political engagements continue to place large mining companies as strategic drivers, engagements will focus less on achieving transfers of technology and knowledge that the environment needs.
Political engagements should be utilized as a venue to achieve sustainable development.
The government possesses the tool of political engagement to summon for support in areas they need help in. But unless corruption and political intervention can be eliminated, the engagements will continue to work in favor of foreign mining companies.
Avenue of Capital
Mining companies have become an avenue of capital that has presented governments the illusion of expanding their workforce, accelerating their economic growth, and contributing to a success they would have otherwise not been able to achieve.
Large mining companies will continue to serve as an avenue of capital that only serves short-term revenues with no added values to the economy, and even less to the environment.
Although the government is always in search of newer and greater avenues of capital, they have more to lose if the agenda is set by non-state actors like NGOs or mining companies.
Though large mining companies offer the much needed economic boost, in the decades to come, Indonesia will struggle even more to compete globally. Indonesia will still have to find new oil and gas wells to replace the slowly diminishing ones and with that, ensure national security.
engagements and avenue of capital against driving forces of companies in sectors of the economy, the environment, creating sustainable development and governance, we understand where asymmetry is most noticeable and where their tipping point lies between making culling greater profit and opening up to dense foreign investment investments.
Conclusion
For a long time, Indonesia struggled to adopt a mechanism that balances sufficient production -directly contributing to national income-and avoid the risk of dense foreign investment. This had proved to be more and more difficult. Foreign oil and gas companies have become a necessity and are much welcomed. The relationship between the government and companies have become close to dependent. There is much to be gained by inviting the world to operate in the country.
Transfers of knowledge, technology, and the enlargement of the workforce are some of the most tangible exchanges to be had.
However, little of this is visible. In contrast, wells are continuing to mature and shrink. An asymmetrical relation has led to unresolved cases of unfair and miscalculated cost recoveries, the absence of the state in regulating against foreign companies in the downstream sector of oil and gas, and the failure to utilize its domestic reserves for the long term and security purposes. This combination makes it a hotbed of unrest.
By contesting the driving forces that guide companies to achieve their goal against norms that are followed by the state, it is obvious that the government is far outnumbered. is hopeful that the landscape of the oil and gas sector will progress.
